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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Since World War II, expenditures on education have risen 
dramatically. Perhaps no other area of the economy, with the 
possible exception of the health care industry, has experienced 
such a marked increase in demand with its concomitant price 
increase. Both education and health care are economic services 
to which most economists and laymen alike attribute the involve­
ment of a strong element of publicness in their consumption. 
Hence, both are much discussed and argued about in the public 
domain. 
With regard to education, we have moved far, perhaps too 
far from a purely economic view, toward treating it as a pure 
public good. Nevertheless, it undisputedly possesses the 
characteristic of publicness at the elementary and secondary 
levels. Recently, there have been law suits brought in several 
states charging that the current systems of financing educa­
tion violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Put in economic terms, 
the plaintiffs have argued that elementary and secondary 
education is, in substantial part, a public good. Con­
sequently, students should have the opportunity to consume 
education equally or at least more equally than at present. 
Also, the burden of the cost of education at this level, say 
the plaintiffs, should be distributed more equitably, according 
to some acceptable criteria of ability to pay. 
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In addition to this legal challenge to the present system 
of educational finance, it is a fact that many of the local 
school districts in the United States are today confronted 
with a taxpayer revolt. People all over the country are turn­
ing out at the polls to defeat proposals to increase the 
millage rate for education. 
The economic reasons for this are both simple and complex. 
Because of increasing personal income, the demand for education 
is increasing, i.e., in economic terms, it is a normal good. 
Many goods and services, however, have income elasticities 
greater than 1. And yet we do not find rapid price increases 
concomitant with the increased demand for them. Why? It is 
here that the problem becomes more complex: 
A. Being a service industry, education is a labor 
intensive process. To date, at least, the ability 
to substitute capital for labor in education has 
been almost nonexistent. 
B. The increase in demand for education in most 
instances is not for an increase in quantity (i.e., 
not for longer days, more days, or more years), 
but rather for an increase in quality. So far, 
the only way the education industry has been able 
to supply this increase in quality is through more 
intensive use of labor, i.e., a higher and higher 
teacher-to-pupil ratio. 
3 
Given these somewhat peculiar supply and demand character­
istics, the cost of education has shot up dramatically. 
But why are the taxpayers revolting, given that the major 
reason for the increased demand for education is increased 
incomes? The answer to this probably lies in the antiquated 
way in which elementary and secondary education is, for the 
most part, financed in the United States. 
There is a strong positive correlation between income and 
wealth. In the early days of this country, the major form of 
wealth was real property. Given this fact, plus the constitu­
tional restriction against an income tax, the logical tax to 
finance education was a tax on property. Hence, a property 
tax would in a sense be a proportional income tax. The America 
of the Twentieth Century is much different. Wealth now takes 
many diverse forms ranging from real property through a myriad 
of paper assets to human wealth or human capital. No longer 
is there a strong positive correlation between income and 
property.^ Evidence indicates in fact that for some areas 
there is a negative correlation between these two variables 
(4). The present study suggests that there is little positive 
correlation in Iowa between per capita income and per capita 
property on a county by county basis. 
^For purposes of this study, "property" will be defined 
as both real and personal property. 
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Given these facts, it is little wonder that in many areas 
of the United States millage proposals for school finance are 
being turned down. The people demanding better quality educa­
tion are typically the people with higher incomes, while the 
people being asked to pay are the owners of property. Today 
there is little if any positive correlation between the income 
demanding and the "wealth" being asked to supply this service. 
This study attempts to discern the important variables 
which determine the amount of spending on education. It is 
primarily concerned with the equitable treatment of taxpayers 
and only incidentally with the equitable treatment of students. 
For example, it will assume that the consumption of education 
is a pure public good and, therefore, all students should 
receive the same educational opportunities. This assumption 
is made in order to show what type of tax structure is needed 
to equitably distribute the resulting tax burden. It may or 
may not be a good assumption, depending upon the outcome of 
future court decisions. 
The Problem in Iowa 
The problem in Iowa concerning the financing of elementary 
and secondary education is generally perceived to be the wide 
variation in per capita and/or per student property values 
among local districts. This is a one dimensional perception 
of the problem which, as mentioned previously, is most likely 
a carryover from the early days of the country when real estate 
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and wealth were highly correlated. There is indeed a wide 
variation in per capita property values among Iowa counties, 
but there is also a wide variation in per capita income across 
Iowa. The problem, however, is not one dimensional because 
variations in property are not a good indicator or proxy of 
the variation in wealth or income among localities. 
Investment in education is a vehicle whereby society and 
individuals, by creating human capital, attempt to increase 
their total wealth and income streams. The findings of many 
research studies have indicated that this has been a very 
lucrative form of investment. It does not follow, however, 
that property or the owners of property (especially real 
estate) have captured a major or even a significant portion of 
this increased wealth and income. If we are concerned with 
horizontal and vertical equity in the taxing schemes devised 
to finance education, then, presumably, those who benefit more 
should pay more and those who benefit equally should pay 
equally. Heavy reliance on a property tax to finance public 
education does not appear to satisfy this criterion. It 
appears to fail even in Iowa where one would expect some corre­
lation between income and property, given the state's heavy 
concentration in farming. 
In this study the ninety-nine counties in Iowa are the 
experimental units. For each county the market value of all 
real and personal property was estimated on a per capita basis. 
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In addition, county per capita income estimates were obtained 
from the 1970 U.S. Census (7). The correlation coefficient 
between these two variables was .0188, indicating virtually no 
linear association between them. 
The problem to be addressed in this study, then, is three­
fold: 
1. A method must be devised to accurately measure the 
variation in school tax burden among Iowa localities. 
Because of data limitations, counties will be used 
here. (Observations on school districts would be 
more satisfactory.) 
2. A model will be constructed which attempts to explain 
the variation in demand for education which exists 
among Iowa counties. 
3. The model will be solved and the resulting implica­
tions will be analyzed to ascertain if the model 
contains a realistic solution to the problem of 
public school finance. The criteria used to judge 
the results will be consistency and horizontal and 
vertical equity. 
Consistency is here defined as a tax scheme which will 
raise the same dollar total presently raised by the school 
millage, with reasonable tax rates and economically sound tax 
bases. 
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Horizontal equity refers to the equal treatment of equals. 
In this context we will be concerned with the equal treatment 
of equals who are situated in different counties. Given the 
present system of school finance, equals (using property as 
the unit of measure) may be treated (taxed) quite differently 
depending upon their county of residence. We are interested 
in gaining or at least moving toward a tax system which is 
horizontally equitable. 
Vertical equity refers to the unequal treatment of un-
equals. It is an almost universally accepted taxation 
criterion in America that the rich should pay more than the 
poor. This does not and need not imply progressive taxation. 
A consistently defined and fairly enforced proportional tax 
will provide vertical equity in an absolute sense. Those who 
own or control more of the tax base will pay more, dollar-wise, 
than those who are less fortunate or industrious. The problem 
of vertical equity is complex. Both wealth (property) and 
income are reasonable tax bases. The problem is how to deter­
mine who is better off—the taxpayer with little property but 
high income or vice versa. As stated above, this would not be 
such a pervasive problem if there was a good correlation 
between income and property. 
To the layman, the most obvious injustices of the present 
school tax system are problems of horizontal equity. Serious 
problems of vertical equity exist, however, and hopefully the 
analysis contained here will shed light on this. 
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CHAPTER II. MEASURING THE INEQUITY AND 
THE PROBLEM OF TAX BASE 
The primary purpose of this chapter is to quantify the 
variation in school millage rates across Iowa in a fashion 
which will permit statistical analysis. In addition, a simple 
solution will be tried and analyzed. 
Given the existing variation in the assessment/sales ratio 
among counties, simple comparison of millage rates between two 
or more localities is misleading. One way to correct this 
bias is to convert assessed values to market values. Each year 
the State of Iowa publishes a summary of its real estate 
assessment/sales ratio study. The report used for this study 
was the 1971 edition (5) . With the use of this report and the 
additional assumption that personal property is assessed at 
the same rate as real property, an estimate of the market value 
of taxable property in each county can be made. After per­
forming this transformation, one can make legitimate compari­
sons concerning taxable property and school millage rates 
across counties. 
The procedure used below to calculate market values is 
the same as that used by Meyer in 1962 (2). 
Let: 
AV^ = assessed value of taxable property in county i. 
SR^ = ratio of assessed value to market value in 
county i. 
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Then: 
MVj, = market value of taxable property in county i. 
AV. 
MV. = ^ 
i SR. 
Since the ratio of assessed value to market value varies 
significantly between urban and rural property in many counties, 
the formula was applied separately to urban and rural property 
for each county. The market values used to calculate per 
capita property in Table 1, Column 1, were obtained by summing 
the calculated market values for urban and rural property in 
each county. The data on assessed value were obtained from the 
State of Iowa (5), while the population estimates came from the 
1970 Census (7). 
With these estimates of the market value of taxable 
property in each county, it is now a simple matter to convert 
school millage rates so that they too are comparable. 
Let: 
= total dollars raised by the property tax for 
education in county i. 
MV^ = the market value of all taxable property in 
county i. 
r^ = the market value millage rate for education in 
county i. 
Then: 
1 MV. 
Table 1. Variation in the existing local school tax base, rate, and yield 
!i . !!i !i . !!i 
MV. $. $. r. - R n. En. s. Es. 
county ^ r, ^ ' 
1 11 11 
En^ Es 
Adair 17,650 .0116 205 792 -.1145 .2732 .1250 
Adams 17,070 . 0121 205 803 0763 .2732 . 1406 
Allamakee 12,602 .0114 144 570 ••.1297 -.1055 -.1903 
Appanoose 9, 029 .0135 122 599 . 0305 -.2422 -.1491 
Audubon 18,782 .0109 206 767 -.1679 .2795 .0894 
Benton 17,154 . 0112 193 739 -.1450 . 1987 .0497 
Black Hawk 7,762 .0174 135 592 . 3282 -.1614 -. 1590 
Boone 14 ,305 .0117 167 800 -.1068 .0372 .1363 
Bremer 11,508 .0126 146 625 -.0381 -.0931 -.1122 
Buchanan 11,856 .0136 161 655 .0381 0 -.0696 
Buena Vista 15,934 .0097 154 674 -.2595 - .0434 -.0426 
Butler 15,876 .0111 177 674 -.1526 .0993 -.0426 
Calhoun 20,951 . 0099 204 857 -.2442 . 2670 .2173 
Carroll 14,066 .0081 115 722 -.3816 -.2857 .0255 
Cass 14,651 .0096 141 581 -.2671 -.1242 -.1747 
Cedar 16,026 .0125 201 776 -.0458 .2484 .1022 
Cerro Gordo 12,182 .0137 168 721 . 0458 .0434 .0241 
Cherokee 16,860 .0103 163 631 -.2137 .0124 -.1036 
Chickasaw 13,210 .0117 155 564 -.1068 -.0372 -.1988 
Clarke 14,483 .0105 153 744 -.1984 -.0496 .0568 
Clay 16,829 . 0106 178 702 -.1908 . 1055 -.0028 
Clayton 11,253 .0146 165 653 . 1145 .0248 -.0724 
Clinton 13,203 .0124 165 699 -.0534 .0248 -.0071 
Crawford 15,351 .0116 179 745 -.1145 .1118 .0582 
Dallas 14,887 .0114 170 676 -.1297 .0559 .0397 
Table 1 (Continued) 
MV $. 
County -ET fi a-
Davis 13,926 .0124 173 
Decatur 11,550 . 0102 118 
Delaware 13,010 . 0132 172 
Des Moines 9,577 . 0159 153 
Dickinson 19,419 .0084 166 
Dubuque 8,559 .0144 124 
Emmet 13,803 . 0116 160 
Fayette 12,251 .0137 168 
Floyd 13,403 .0127 171 
Franklin 24,904 .008 201 
Fremont 19,937 .0109 219 
Greene 21,194 . 0102 217 
Grundy 22,048 .0095 211 
Guthrie 15,471 . 0103 160 
Hamilton 19,451 .0111 216 
Hancock 22,474 .0091 206 
Hardin 16,466 .0094 155 
Harrison 14,807 .0018 175 
Henry 11,345 .0121 138 
Howard 13,233 . 0126 168 
Humboldt 21,143 .0103 219 
Ida 19,687 . 0111 220 
Iowa 16,081 .0114 185 
Jackson 11,146 .0132 148 
Jasper 12,940 . 013 169 
700 -.0534 . 0745 -.0056 
589 -.2213 -.2670 -.1633 
683 . 0076 .0683 -.0298 
682 . 2137 -.0496 -.0312 
675 -.3587 . 0310 -.0411 
845 .0992 -.2298 . 2002 
652 -.1145 -.0062 -.0738 
676 .0458 .0434 -.0397 
717 -.0305 .0621 .0184 
794 -.3893 . 2484 .1278 
924 -.1697 . 3602 .3125 
904 -.2213 .3478 . 2840 
854 -.2748 .3105 .2130 
728 -.2137 -.0062 . 0340 
856 -.1526 .3416 .2159 
793 -.3053 . 2795 . 1264 
665 -.2824 -.0372 -.0553 
716 -.0992 .0869 .0170 
602 -.0763 -.1428 -.1448 
708 -.0381 . 0434 .0056 
841 -.2137 . 3602 .1946 
857 -.1526 .3664 . 2173 
769 -.1297 .1490 .0923 
635 . 0076 -.0807 -.0980 
690 -.0076 .0496 -.0198 
Table 1 (Continued) 
MV. $. 
county ^ r. 
1 1 
Jefferson 11,372 .0131 149 
Johnson 9,317 .0177 165 
Jones 13,642 . 0126 173 
Keokuk 14,799 . 0122 166 
Kossuth 19,293 .0104 202 
Lee 10,600 .0132 140 
Linn 9,534 . 0182 174 
Louisa 15,524 . 012 187 
Lucas 11,630 .0128 150 
Lyon 18,028 . 0093 168 
Madison 17,553 .0107 189 
Mahaska 11,328 .0144 164 
Marion 10,704 .0114 123 
Marshall 12,013 .015 181 
Mills 22,947 .0084 193 
Mitchell 13,690 .0114 157 
Monona 17,375 .0106 185 
Monroe 11,579 .0138 160 
Montgomery 14,851 .0109 162 
Muscatine 11,372 .0128 146 
O'Brien 16,604 .0092 154 
Osceola 20,049 .0106 214 
Page 12,280 . 0122 150 
Palo Alto 16,351 .0117 192 
Plymouth 15,875 .0101 161 
673 0 -.0745 -.0440 
909 . 3511 .0248 .2911 
755 -.0381 .0745 .0724 
720 -.1450 .0310 .0227 
939 -.2061 . 2546 . 3338 
620 .0076 -.1304 -.1193 
755 .3893 .0807 . 0724 
735 -0.839 .1614 .0440 
626 -.0229 -.0683 -.1-107 
637 -.2900 .0434 -.0951 
785 -.1832 .2298 . 1150 
796 .0992 .0186 . 1306 
607 -.1297 -.2360 -.1377 
811 .1450 . 1242 .1519 
846 -.3587 .1987 .2017 
636 -.1297 -.0248 -.0965 
771 -.1908 . 1490 .0951 
737 .0534 -.0062 .0468 
722 -.1679 . 0062 .0258 
596 -.0229 -.0931 -.1534 
658 -.2977 -.0434 -.0653 
847 -.1908 . 3291 .2031 
709 -.0687 -.0683 .0071 
753 -.1068 . 1925 .0696 
736 -.2290 0 .0454 
Table 1 (Continued) 
!i . !!i !i . !!i 
MV. $. $. r. - R n. En. s. Es. 
^ -i if E$. ' E$. ' 1 11 1 1 
En^ Zs^ 
Pocahontas 21,942 .0091 202 852 -.3053 .2546 .2102 
Polk 9,524 . 0167 159 702 .2748 -.0124 -.0028 
Pottawattamie 8,696 .0164 143 566 .2519 -.1118 -.1960 
Poweshiek 14,436 .0117 170 720 -.1068 . 0559 . 0227 
Ringgold 16,162 .0124 201 856 -.0534 .2484 . 2459 
Sac 18,908 .0097 184 720 -.2595 . 1428 . 0227 
Scott 10,014 .0179 179 735 . 3664 . 1118 .0440 
Shelby 16,647 . 0108 181 750 -.1755 .1242 . 0653 
Sioux 15,263 .0097 149 792 -.2595 -.0745 .1250 
Story 9,166 .0149 137 723 .1374 -.1490 . 0269 
Tama 14,891 .0123 184 731 -.0610 . 1428 .0383 
Taylor 13,569 .011 152 682 -.1603 -.0559 -.0312 
Union 11,714 .012 140 607 -.0839 -.1304 -.1377 
Van Buren 11,867 .0119 138 614 -.0916 -.1428 -.1278 
Wapello 6,722 .0188 127 547 .4351 -.2111 -.2230 
Warren 10,461 .0153 160 586 . 1679 -.0062 -.1676 
Washington 15,487 . 0119 185 734 -.0916 .1490 . 0426 
Wayne 14,163 .0104 147 680 -.2061 -.0869 -.0340 
Webster 12,461 .0112 141 626 -.1450 -.1242 -.1107 
Winnebago 15,352 .0095 146 644 -.2748 -.0931 -.0852 
Winneshiek 10,320 .0132 136 668 . 0076 -.1552 -.0511 
Woodbury 9,297 .0142 132 599 .0839 -.1801 -.1491 
Worth 19,473 .01 197 847 -.2366 . 2236 .2031 
Wright 19,954 .0105 211 874 -.1984 . 3105 .2414 
State-wide average 12,276 . 0131 161 704 
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The school millage levied in Iowa (Z$^) in 1970 and 
collected in 1971 amounted to $455,321,653.83. The total 
market value of taxable property in Iowa (ZMV^), as estimated 
above, comes to $34,672,571,709.00. Letting R equal the state­
wide average we get: 
p = i!i_ = 455,321,653.83 ^ 
EMV^ 34,672,571,709.00 
Thus, the average rate of property taxation in Iowa for 
public schools is 1.31 percent of market value. Or alternately 
stated, the school levy on average is 13.1 mills per market 
value dollar. As can be seen in Column 2 of Table 1, there is 
considerable variation above and below this state-wide average. 
The remaining columns of Table 1 were calculated as 
follows : 
Column 3: — = the total dollar levy in county i ($.) 
*i 
divided by the total population in county i (n^) . 
Column 4: —; this is calculated in the same manner as 
^i 
Column 3 except that the number of public school students in 
grades K through 12 is used instead of the total county popula­
tion. The data on students were obtained from the 1970 Census 
(7) . 
ri - R 
Column 5: —; this column is a measure of the per­
centage variation in school tax rates. From the calculated 
15 
millage rate in each county (r^), the state-wide average (R = 
.0131) is subtracted and the difference is divided by the 
state-wide average. 
n. Zn. 
Column 6: —^ ; Column 6 measures the percentage 
Zn^ 
deviation in dollars per capita raised by the local school tax, 
The state-wide average was calculated as follows: 
s. Ss. 
Column 7: — ; Column 7 is calculated in the same 
ISi 
fashion as Column 6 except that the appropriate student popula­
tion is used in place of the total population of the state or 
counties. In this case the state-wide average equals $704.00. 
From Table 1 it is plain that there is a great deal of 
variation in per capita property values. Likewise, there is 
considerable variation in school millage rates, dollars raised 
per capita, and dollars raised per student. The important 
question to be asked is, "Is the variation in per capita 
property values the sole or at least the primary cause of the 
variation in the latter variables?" In many cases, although 
this question is not directly posited, an affirmative answer 
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is assumed. Therefore, assume for now that the answer is yes. 
An additional assumption will be made that education is a 
pure public good and, therefore, each student should share 
equally in the total school levy. This assumption, like all 
assumptions in economics, is a simplification of reality. It 
is made here because it appears to represent, to a significant 
extent, current popular opinion. Also, court decisions have 
moved, and it appears will continue to move, in this direction. 
This is not to say, however, that future court decisions will 
require absolute equality in expenditures per student. Such a 
decision is extremely unlikely. The usefulness of this 
assumption is that it will allow us to formulate here, and in 
a later chapter, "equitable" solutions to the problem of public 
school finance by providing an objective or goal to be attained. 
Given these two assumptions, the problem of equalizing 
tax burdens and per pupil expenditures has an obvious two-part 
solution. First, the state must impose the state-wide average 
millage rate of .0131 on all taxable property within its 
boundaries. Second, it must redistribute money from those 
counties where a millage rate of .0131 yields more than $704 
per student to those counties where the .0131 rate yields less 
than $704 per student. The uniform rate of .0131 yields the 
same total revenue, solving the problem of horizontal inequity 
between taxpayers in different counties, and the state redis­
tribution of the funds will provide for equal expenditures per 
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child among the counties. This is a simple solution to the 
school finance problem which to many would seem both reasonable 
and equitable. 
Table 2 shows the results of this solution along with two 
new variables of interest. The columns of Table 2 are as 
follows : 
Column 1: Existing —; this is simply a repeat of Column 
i 
3, Table 1. 
Column 2: New — = the new per capita tax burden for 
i 
each county calculated on the basis of a millage rate of .0131 
per market value dollar. 
Column 3: A — = (Column 1 - Column 2) = the per capita 
*i 
change in the tax burden resulting from the application of the 
uniform millage rate. 
y. 
Column 4: — = the per capita income of each county 
i 
obtained from the 1970 Census (7). 
s. 
Column 5: — = the ratio of public school students in 
"i 
grades K through 12 to total population for each county. 
As mentioned above, the solution obtained is horizontally 
equitable. It is also consistent to the extent that it will 
raise the same total revenue as the existing tax scheme with 
reasonable (i.e., .0131) tax rates. Whether or not the base 
Table 2. The resulting change in the impact of the school levy with a uniform 
millage rate, and the variation in per capita income and per capita students 
$i $. ?. Y. s. 
County Existing — Calculated — A — — — 
n. n. n. n. n. 1  1 1 1 1  
Adair 205 231 26 2,914 .2587 
Adams 205 223 18 2,409 .2578 
Allamakee 144 165 21 2,315 .2530 
Appanoose 122 118 - 4 2,414 .2045 
Audubon 206 246 40 2,377 . 2690 
Benton 193 225 32 2,869 .2609 
Black Hawk 135 102 -33 3,013 ,2284 
Boone 167 187 20 2,814 .2092 
Bremer 146 151 5 2,926 .2329 
Buchanan 161 155 - 6 2,488 .2464 
Buena Vista 154 209 55 3,009 . 2292 
Butler 177 208 31 2,561 .2627 
Calhoun 204 274 70 2,710 .2383 
Carroll 115 184 69 2,406 . 1590 
Cass 141 192 51 2,728 .2420 
Cedar 201 210 9 2,936 .2587 
Cerro Gordo 168 160 - 8 2,973 .2329 
Cherokee 163 221 58 2,768 .2588 
Chickasaw 155 173 18 2,276 .2751 
Clarke 153 190 37 2,703 .2059 
Clay 178 220 42 3,070 .2542 
Clayton 165 147 -18 2,272 .2534 
Clinton 16 5 173 8 2,965 .2358 
Crawford 179 201 22 2 ,465 .2400 
Dallas 170 19 5 25 2,943 .2517 
Table 2 (Continued) 
County Existing 
Davis 173 
Decatur 118 
Delaware 172 
Des Moines 153 
Dickinson 166 
Dubuque 124 
Emmett 160 
Fayette 168 
Floyd 171 
Franklin 201 
Fremont 219 
Greene 217 
Grundy 211 
Guthrie 160 
Hamilton 216 
Hancock 206 
Hardin 155 
Harrison 175 
Henry 138 
Howard 168 
Humboldt 219 
Ida 220 
Iowa 185 
Jackson 148 
Jasper 169 
Calculated — 
n. 
182 9 2,503 .2471 
151 33 1,982 .2001 
170 - 2 2,337 .2518 
125 -28 3,103 . 2238 
254 88 2,785 . 2423 
112 -12 2,696 . 1462 
181 21 2,554 .2458 
160 - 8 2,444 .2481 
176 5 2,682 .2379 
326 125 2,664 .2533 
261 42 2,683 .2370 
278 61 3,092 .2405 
289 78 2,982 . 2473 
203 43 2,449 .2197 
255 39 2,843 . 2526 
294 88 2,609 .2602 
216 61 2,950 .2335 
194 19 2,510 . 2443 
149 11 2,885 .2291 
173 5 2,662 .2371 
277 58 2,634 .2608 
258 38 3,317 . 2564 
211 26 2,482 .2402 
146 - 2 2,595 .2324 
170 1 3 ,024 .2449 
Table 2 (Continued) 
County Existing 
Jefferson 149 
Johnson 165 
Jones 173 
Keokuk 166 
Kossuth 202 
Lee 140 
Linn 174 
Louisa 187 
Lucas 150 
Lyon 168 
Madison 189 
Mahaska 164 
Marion 123 
Marshall 181 
Mills 193 
Mitchell 157 
Monona 185 
Monroe 160 
Montgomery 162 
Muscatine 146 
0'Brien 154 
Osceola 214 
Page 150 
Palo Alto 192 
Plymouth 161 
149 0 
122 -43 
178 6 
194 28 
253 51 
139 - 1 
125 -49 
203 16 
152 2 
236 68 
230 41 
148 -16 
140 17 
157 -24 
301 108 
179 22 
228 43 
152 - 8 
195 33 
149 3 
218 64 
263 49 
161 11 
214 22 
208 47 
2,803 .2216 
3,007 .1814 
2,491 . 2292 
2,455 .2308 
2,464 .2151 
2,847 .2126 
3,208 . 2310 
2,666 . 2551 
2,594 .2395 
2,472 .2633 
2,651 . 2413 
2,544 .2063 
2,677 .2025 
3,095 .2232 
3,129 .2286 
2,473 . 2465 
2,603 .2402 
2,341 .2173 
2,982 .2247 
2,998 .2455 
2,451 . 2337 
2,598 .2529 
2,712 .2118 
2,643 . 2553 
2,39 3 .2182 
Table 2 (Continued) 
County Existing 
$i 
Calculated — 
"i ' & 
^i 
"i 
= 1 
"i 
Pocahontas 202 287 85 2,586 .2367 
Polk 159 125 -34 3,446 .2268 
Pottawattamie 143 114 -29 2,836 .2524 
Poweshiek 170 189 19 3,159 .2366 
Ringgold 201 212 11 2,555 .2344 
Sac 184 248 6 4  2,875 .2558 
Scott 179 131 -48 3,296 .2439 
Shelby 181 218 37 2,486 .2417 
Sioux 149 200 51 2,226 . 1878 
Story 137 120 -17 3 ,068 .1893 
Tama 184 195 11 2,592 . 2515 
Taylor 152 178 26 2,278 .2226 
Union 140 153 13 2,429 .2314 
Van Buren 138 155 17 2,150 .2241 
Wapello 127 88 -39 2,756 .2323 
Warren 160 137 -23 2,838 .2737 
Washington 185 203 18 2,893 .2515 
Wayne 147 186 39 2,360 .2168 
Webster 141 163 22 2,872 .2247 
Winnebago 146 201 55 2,845 .2267 
Winneshiek 136 135 - 1 2,538 . 2042 
Woodbury 132 122 -10 2,886 . 2204 
Worth 197 255 58 2,923 .2320 
Wright 211 261 50 3,662 .2417 
State-wide average 161 161 0 2,894 .2288 
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(property) is economically sound is not of primary importance 
here. Rather, by assumption, we have postulated that it is. 
This leaves the problem of vertical equity. 
It is intuitively obvious that with the use of property 
as the base, a uniform millage rate will satisfy the criterion 
of vertical equity. The more property an individual or 
business has, the more tax will be paid. However, the standard 
measure of ability to pay in America is income. If it can be 
shown that there is a reasonably good correlation between 
taxable property and income, then it can be assumed that our 
solution will pass this test of vertical equity as well. The 
facts do not bear this out. The correlation coefficient 
between per capita taxable property (Table 1, Column 1) and per 
capita income (Table 2, Column 4) is only .0188. The impact 
of this tax, from the standpoint of vertical equity with income 
as the base, must be investigated. 
Column 3 of Table 2 is, in effect, a state imposed 
property tax on the residents of each county. When Column 3 
assumes a positive number it is a normal or positive tax. In 
the case of a negative number it may be looked upon as a 
negative tax or a subsidy. In essence, the state would be 
transferring tax burden from one county to another. If each 
element of Column 3 is multiplied by its respective population 
figure, the sum must equal zero. The total yield of the 
property tax is not being changed, only the distribution of 
the burden is being altered. From whom and to whom is this 
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burden being shifted with respect to income? Carrying out the 
necessary calculations indicates that, in total, a tax levy 
burden of approximately 43 million dollars would be redistri­
buted in the following fashion. 
Recipients Payers 
Number 1,567,607 1,256,769 
Per capita income $3,028 $2,725 
Per capita subsidy-tax $27.43 $34.22 
Subsidy-tax as a percent of 
per capita income .009 .0125 
(Based on 1970 data) 
It is evident, using income as the yardstick, that this 
solution to the school finance problem violates the principle 
of vertical equity. It is plainly regressive in that, in 
effect, it amounts to a 43 million dollar income transfer by 
the state from the "poor" to the "rich".^ 
This poses somewhat of a dilemma. With property as the 
base the condition of vertical equity is satisfied; with income 
as the base it is violated. Both, it can be argued, are 
reasonable bases upon which to tax. What is particularly 
sobering, however, is that unless income and property are 
highly correlated (and they are not), no unidimensional tax 
scheme will satisfy the equity criteria with respect to both 
^Assuming that all property is owned by the residents of 
that county. 
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bases. Which one then is the proper or more economically 
sound base? Instead of assuming that property is the correct 
base, as was done- above, we will substitute a different norma­
tive assumption. In answering this question, the following 
value judgment will be made: "Leaving welfare considerations 
aside, it seems a reasonable assumption, even in the domain of 
public or quasi-public goods, that the individuals who demand 
a good should in the main pay for it." Theoretically, the 
answer to the dilemma hinges on the ability to distinguish 
between income, property, and other variables as the ultimate 
factors leading to differences in the demand for education. 
If this distinction can be made empirically as well, then, 
hopefully, a satisfactory solution can be obtained. The "modus 
operendi" will be to allocate to each independent variable its 
"fair share" of the total burden. To accomplish this an 
economic model must be developed and tested. 
The task of Chapters III and IV will be to develop and 
test such a model- If the results indicate that property is 
the sole, significant source of variation in the demand for 
education, then we will conclude that property is the relevant 
base for school taxation. Furthermore, the solution described 
above will be accepted as the "correct" one. If, on the other 
hand, income accounts for a statistically significant amount 
of the variation, it must share the burden. Indeed, this 
applies to other causal variables as well. 
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CHAPTER III. THE MODEL 
Before building a model it is first necessary to clearly 
define the problem. Then, with the aid of economic theory, 
certain a priori restrictions or conditions can be established. 
Chapters I and II defined the problem, namely the inequities 
involved in financing public schools. It is the latter 
necessity to which we will now turn. 
The problem to which this study is addressed is the varia­
tion in inter-county millage rates for education. The purposes 
of the paper are to explain this variation and to find an 
equitable solution. Intimately associated with this problem, 
indeed it is the same problem differently stated, is the varia­
tion in per capita tax burdens to finance public education. 
The task at hand is to construct a theoretical model that will 
consistently explain both phenomena. 
Let us begin by making the assumption that the dollar 
cost (price) of a given quality of education does not vary 
significantly among Iowa counties. This assumption implies 
that any variation in expenditure per pupil among counties 
results in actual differences in the quality of education being 
consumed by the pupils in these counties. At first, such a 
supposition may seem exceedingly restrictive and unrealistic. 
In many states, especially those with large metropolitan areas, 
this would undoubtedly be true. It does not appear, however, 
that the cost of living, except for housing, varies 
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significantly across Iowa. With respect to the cost of housing, 
it must be remembered that, in fact, a large part of the varia­
tion in its cost is due to variations in expenditures for 
education as expressed through millage rates. Even in Iowa the 
dollar cost of a given quality of teacher probably does vary to 
some extent due to collective bargaining pressure. However, 
this pressure is most common in urban areas where one would 
expect some economies of scale to exist. In addition, these 
urban areas also have lower transportation costs. Considering 
all factors, making this assumption for Iowa may not be as 
restrictive as it first seems. The purpose of this assumption, 
while not obvious at this time, is that it will allow us to put 
certain a priori homogeneity restrictions on the model to be 
formulated. 
Variation in Per Capita Expenditure 
Given the above assumption, variations in per capita 
dollar expenditures for elementary and secondary education can 
loosely be construed as the variation in the demand for educa­
tion. Treating it in this way helps to delineate the variables 
which an economist would expect to exert a causal effect on 
these expenditures. In general we would expect: 
W  =  f  X 2 /  .  ••  . )  
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where: 
W = the dollars raised per capita by the local school 
millage. 
X's = the various factors influencing or determining how 
much is raised per capita by the school millage. 
It is impossible to include every factor (X) which 
influences expenditures per capita (W). There are undoubtedly 
an unwieldly number of them. In limiting the number of X's, 
we must theoretically posit which are the important ones. For 
this study the general hypothesis will be that: 
W = ffX^, Xg, X3, X4) (A)l 
where: 
X^ = per capita income (see Column 4, Table 2); 
X2 = per capita taxable property (see Column 1, Table 1); 
X^ = the ratio of public school students in grades K 
through 12 to population (see Column 5, Table 2); 
X^ = the ratio of nonpublic school students in grades K 
through 12 to population. 
^The following system will be used in designating equa­
tions: Capital letters will denote general functional forms; 
numbers will denote specific functional forms. The following 
format will be used for numbered equations: The first number 
will indicate chapter number; the number following the decimal 
point will indicate position within the chapter; e.g.. Equation 
3.1 is the first specific functional form equation listed in 
Chapter 3. 
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The income variable (X^) certainly belongs in any demand 
equation. In the specific case of interest here, we can make 
use of previous information gathered from numerous other 
studies and postulate that income will exert a positive 
influence on W. This is testable hypothesis one: 
The per capita taxable property variable (Xg) belongs in 
the equation for two distinct reasons. First, and most 
obvious, property is the base upon which the school tax is 
levied; therefore, it must influence expenditures per capita. 
Second, property is a form of wealth. Theoretically, wealth 
influences an economic unit's demand for goods and services. 
The higher the wealth the greater the demand and vice versa. 
The second testable hypothesis will be: 
The third variable (X^) would appear to be an important 
determinant of expenditures per capita. Ceteris paribus, the 
higher the student per capita ratio in a county, the higher 
will be its per capita expenditure on education. Therefore 
we have: 
(A-H-1) 1 
(A-H-2) 
^This notation is to be read, "Equation A, hypothesis 
one. " 
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> 0 (A-H-3) 
The last variable (X^) would appear to be highly 
significant if it varies to any extent from county to county. 
On purely theoretical grounds it should be included as a 
possible source of variation in expenditures per capita. 
< 0 (A-H-4) 
Now that the relevant variables have been specified, the 
problem of functional form arises. It will be possible in this 
case to theoretically determine a specific functional form. 
Before this is attempted, however, it is necessary to discuss 
the second source of variation of interest in this study. 
Variation in School Millage Rates 
Since the variation in school millage rates is an 
integral part of this investigation, a functional explanation 
must be developed. This is an easy task now that Equation A 
has been formulated. All that is involved is elementary 
mathematical manipulation. 
By definition, the school millage rate (r) is simply 
equal to expenditures per capita on elementary and secondary 
education (W) divided by per capita taxable property (Xg). 
Dividing both sides of Equation A by per capita taxable 
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property yields a functional representation of the millage 
rate in terms of the same independent or explanatory variables 
contained in Equation A. 
r = f(X^, X3, X^) (B) 
where : 
||- > 0 (B-H-1) 
Il- < 0 (B-H-2) 
> 0 (B-H-3) 
||- < 0 (B-H-4) 
Notice that three of the four predicted signs are the 
same as in Equation A. The one sign reversal involves the 
taxable property variable (Xg). In Equation A we hypothesized 
that property, because it is a form of wealth, will exert a 
positive influence on expenditures per capita for education. 
Now we predict that as taxable property per capita goes up, 
holding other variables constant, the school millage rate will 
fall. Taken separately, there is nothing unusual or suspect 
about either prediction. They are both plausible hypotheses 
consistent with economic theory. For both to hold 
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simultaneously, however, requires a specific relationship 
which provides the basis for an additional empirical test. 
The elasticity of the school miliage rate (r) with respect 
to changes in per capita taxable property (Xg) must lie some­
where in the range between 0 and -1. 
-1 < 0 (C-H-1) 
In nontechnical terms the condition is fairly straight­
forward. As property increases (decreases), the millage rate 
will fall (increase). The change in the millage rate, however, 
measured in percentage terms must be less than the percentage 
change in per capita taxable property. This condition must 
hold in order for the hypothesized wealth effect to exist. 
Of course, this new hypothesis could have been formulated 
in terms of Equation A. In this event, the restriction would 
have been on the elasticity of W with respect to X2. Specifi­
cally, it would be: 
0 < |M- < 1 (C-H-l'j 
Choosing a Functional Form 
We have now identified the problem and specified the 
relevant variables along with their theoretically correct 
signs. One degree of indeterminancy remains. Up to this point 
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nothing has been said about how the variables combine or 
interact in determining school millage rates and expenditures 
per capita. Theoretically, this is the problem of selecting 
a specific functional form. In general, this is a very diffi­
cult problem and many times the choice is made simply on the 
grounds of empirical convenience. Fortunately, given the 
problem and the assumption made in this instance, it is 
possible to do better. 
Following our assumption, the dollar cost of a given 
quality of education does not vary significantly across Iowa. 
One can logically proceed to the conclusion that the function 
explaining the variation in per capita school expenditures must 
be homogeneous of degree one. Verbally, this implies that if 
all the independent variables in Equation A increase (decrease) 
K-fold, per capita expenditures on education will increase 
(decrease) K-fold. The logic of this conclusion can be seen 
by expressing the relationship in per student terms where it 
is obvious that such a change leaves the dollar amount of 
income and property per student and the ratio of private to 
public school pupils unchanged. It seems reasonable in such a 
case that the existing expenditures per pupil would be main­
tained. Expressing this algebraically we have: 
Starting with Equation A: 
W — f{Xj^, ^2' ^3r ^4! (A) 
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S . 
Dividing through by ^ 
V ' V ' ' Y X4 X3 
(Al) 
Here it is obvious that if all variables, including X^, 
double (for example) there will be no change in the dependent 
variable. The reason is, of course, that in this formulation 
the dependent variable is a function of relative magnitudes, 
which are unaffected by the hypothesized change. The main 
point is, however, that if X^,...,X^ increase K-fold, and there 
is no reason to expect any change in per student expenditures 
(i.e.. Equation Al is homogeneous of degree zero), the 
dependent variable in Equation A must change by K-fold (i.e.. 
Equation A is homogeneous of degree one). 
Continuing with this same reasoning process, it becomes 
obvious that Equation B, which expresses the school millage 
rate in terms of variables through X^, must be homogeneous 
of degree zero. This must hold because in deriving Equation B 
we simply divide all the terms of Equation A by X^. This 
manipulation is completely analogous to the one performed in 
arriving at Equation Al which we have seen is homogeneous of 
degree zero. 
If the reader accepts this analysis, the theoretical 
basis for selecting a specific functional form for Equations A 
and B has been supplied. Starting with Equation A, which must 
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be homogeneous of degree one, the functional form must be such 
that dividing through by the taxable property variable (Xg) 
yields an equation for the school millage rate which is 
homogeneous of degree zero. It can be shown that a simple 
linear formulation will not satisfy this condition. Fortunate­
ly, a multiplicative model, linear in the logs, satisfies this 
and all other conditions set down. 
Let: 
(3.1) 
where: 
3i + $2 + 33 + 34 - 1 (3.1-H-l) 
9W 
9X. 1 
(3.1-H-2) 
ax 2 
(3.1-H-3) 
9W 
ax. 3 
(3.1-H-4) 
aw 
ax 4 
(3.1-H-5) 
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Since all the X's are positive, these hypotheses simply 
imply that A and ^2» and gg must be positive, while 
must be negative. 
Dividing both sides of Equation 3.1 by X2 we get: 
^1 ^2 %3 %4 
r = A Xg X^ X^ (3.2) 
where: 
+ Z2 + + Z4 = 0 (3.2-H-l) 
Zi ^ 
Z 3  = 3 3  Z ^  =  6 4  ( 3 . 2 - H - 2 )  
St" Zz 1 Z - Z_ Z . 
||- = Z^  A X^  X2 Xg X^  > 0 (3.2-H-3) 
a-r Zi Z3I Z- Z. 
= Zg A X^^ X2 X^^ < 0 (3.2-H-4) 
3r Z Z Z-1 Z 
Ix; = Z3 A =1 *2 *3 *4 > 0 (3.2-H-5) 
3r Z Z Z Z-1 
= Z4 A X^^ Xg X^-^ X^^ < 0 (3.2-H-6) 
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Again, since all the X's are positive, the hypotheses 
imply that A, Z^, and are positive, while is negative. 
Notice that here Z^ (gg-l) must be negative as well. 
Next, consider the a priori elasticity restriction. For 
a continuous function such as r = f (X^, , X^, X^), we can 
write the formula for the point elasticity of r with respect 
to X as : 
9r 
_ 221 = marginal function 
rX r average function 
X 
Specifically, the elasticity of r with respect to X^ will 
be : 
9r Z^ Z-1 z Z 
3X_ Z A X^ X_ X_^ X.^ 
—= — = z_ (3.3) 
Zi 2-1 Z Z 
2 A X^-*- Xg X^^ X^4 
Thus, the testable hypothesis is: 
-1 < Zg < 0 (3.3-H-l) 
It should be noted that, although hypothesis 3.3-H-l 
appears to be intuitively obvious, given the previous analysis, 
such is not in general the case. The fact that the elasticity 
hypothesis simplifies to an obvious restriction on the exponent 
for per capita taxable property is a curiousity peculiar to 
the specific functional form adopted here. 
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The Tax Implications of the Model 
Now that equations have been developed and specified to 
explain the variation in the expenditure for public schools, 
the problem becomes one of determining how much of the burden 
should be applied to each causal variable. First, some 
mathematical manipulation is required. Starting with Equation 
3.1, factor out of the righthand side: 
1 ^2 ^3^ ^4 
W = A X^ Xg X X^ (3.4) 
Equation 3.4 can be rewritten as : 
^1 ^2 
W = X3 A X^ Xg 
1 
X, (3.5) 
Since + 02 + 64 
to: 
= 1 - , Equation 3.5 can be transformed 
W = X3 A X. 
(3.5) 
By assumption, the education of public school students is 
to be treated as a pure public good. This is mathematically 
equivalent to treating Xg not as a variable, but rather as a 
parameter set equal to the state-wide average student per 
capita ratio .2288. This gives rise to: 
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One rather straightforward approach to distributing the 
burden would be to allocate it in proportion to the percent of 
the total demand accounted for by each variable. These per­
centages are represented by the B's in our model. If the 
function is linearly homogeneous, the percentages will add up 
to one and the burden will be allocated. A proof of this would 
involve Euler's Theorem which states that for a linearly 
homogeneous function: 
Z X. -^  = W (3.8) 
i=l ^ ^ i 
For the problem at hand this would mean that, if the W-
function were evaluated at a specific point, the partial 
derivatives could be interpreted as the "fair share" tax rates 
on each base (i.e., each factor would be taxed the value of 
its marginal demand). There may be disagreement as to whether 
this method is an equitable way to divide the burden among the 
factors; however, from an economic and mathematical standpoint, 
it is both objective and consistent. Furthermore, the constant 
or proportional tax rates on each base obtained in this fashion 
will, if applied consistently, distribute the burden on each 
base in accordance with the horizontal and vertical equity 
criteria of Chapter I. That is, a proportional tax applied 
uniformly throughout the counties will ensure equal treatment 
of equals, satisfying the horizontal equity criterion. In 
addition, the uniform application of proportional rates will 
39 
distribute the burden on each base in accordance with the 
vertical equity criterion since those who own or control more 
(less) of a base will be taxed more (less) in absolute terms. 
After arriving at Equation 3.7, we are left with only 3 
variables (X^y , and X^) upon which to distribute the burden 
of education. In addition, the revised W-function is no longer 
homogeneous of degree one. This means that the sum of the 
first partial derivatives multiplied by their corresponding 
independent variables will not equal W. This is not surprising. 
We first hypothesized that variable X^ is a significant factor 
in explaining variations in expenditures for education. In 
deriving Equation 3.7, we assumed (made the value judgment) 
that the education of public school students is a pure public 
good and that, therefore, variations in X^ should not influence 
per student expenditures or interpersonal tax rates. Impli­
citly, then, we are assuming that the other variables (X^, X^, 
and X^) must bear the full burden. 
After deriving Equation 3.7 we have : 
w 
f W 
[ ^1 ' 3 
W 
.2288 .2288 
2288 
3 
=1 [.2288j 
3 ^2 [.2288] ^2288j 
. 2 2 8 8  
W 
72288 
"4 
. 2 2 8 8  
4 
.2280 
(3.9) 
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Consequently, the first order partials cannot be 
interpreted as tax rates because they will not be consistent 
(i.e., they will not yield the proper number of dollars per 
student). The partial derivatives must be "scaled up" by 
dividing through by (3^ + + 3^) . 
w  »  
W 
. 2 2 8 8  
2 2 8 8  
9  
X l  
. 2 2 8 8  
, 2 2 8 8  
W 
' ( . 2 2 8 8  
. 2 2 8 8  
($1+32+34) 
X, 
2288 
+ 
3  W  
. 2 2 8 8  ^ 4  1  
3  
= 4  
. 2 2 8 8 ]  
^ . 2 2 8 8 j  (3.10) 
These revised partials can then be interpreted as tax 
rates. Each will in fact be equal to what we have previously 
called the "fair share" tax rate plus that variable's "fair 
share" of the burden belonging to X^. 
If the reader has accepted the analysis up to now, we are 
left with only one additional problem; namely, at what point 
is Equation 3.10 to be evaluated? Actually we have no choice 
in this matter. If we assume that each student should receive 
an equal dollar expenditure for education, we are implying 
that each student should have an equal amount of X^, X2 and X^ 
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at his disposal. Thus, Equation 3.10 must be evaluated with 
the variables set equal to their respective state-wide averages. 
All that remains then is to estimate the 3's so that the 
partial derivatives can be calculated. 
Before concluding this chapter, it should be emphasized 
that the solution discussed in this last section is contingent 
upon the "goodness" of the model we have specified. In fact, 
one can never be sure he has the right model. In practice, we 
must use economic theory as much as possible in establishing 
testable a priori hypotheses, and then, by the use of 
statistics, determine how well the model actually fits the 
data. If the signs and coefficients statistically bear out 
the a priori hypotheses, we can, with varying degrees of con­
fidence, accept our model as a "good" one. This is the topic 
of Chapter IV. 
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CHAPTER IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Within this chapter the model developed in Chapter III is 
tested statistically. Since no complicated statistical problems 
were foreseen, a straightforward multiple regression approach 
was tried. Ex post analysis indicated that the estimated 
coefficients were relatively stable and the residuals well-
behaved. Consequently, the results of this approach were 
eminently satisfactory from the author's viewpoint and they are 
the ones reported and used in this chapter. From other view­
points, however, this may not be the best approach. If, for 
example, we are not concerned with theoretical consistency and/ 
or the true structural relationship, but rather prediction, 
then the researcher may de-emphasize other criteria in 
2 
searching for the model with the highest R . In many cases, 
the different criteria will lead to the selection of different 
models. This is, in fact, the case here. If prediction was 
the goal, a different model would have been selected, since a 
2 1 
simple linear function yields a higher R for Equation 3.1. 
Before estimating the equations, they must be transformed 
from exact to stochastic relationships. For the model under 
proof of this statement involves a transformation of 
the dependent variable, W, by dividing it by its geometric mean 
so as to make the residual sum of squares comparable for the 
two regressions. For an excellent discussion of this 
technique, see Rao and Miller (3), pp. 107-11. 
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consideration this involves adding^ a fourth term to the right 
hand side of each equation: 
^1 ^2 ^3 ^4 u 
W = A Xg X3 X^ e" (4.1) 
^1 ^2 ^3 ^4 V 
r  =  A X ^ - ^ X  X g  ^  X ^  e  ( 4 . 2 )  
where e^ and e^ are multiplicative error terms. We then 
assume that u and v are random variables with expected 
values of zero. 
Next, the functions must be linearized in order to make 
them conformable to the ordinary least squares regression 
technique. This simply involves the taking of logarithms. 
InW = InA + g^lnX^ + 631^X3 + + u (4.3) 
Inr = InA + Z^lnX^ + Z^lnXg + Z^lnXg + Z^lnX^ + v (4.4) 
2 
The regression results for these equations are : 
InW = -.28440 + .30268X^ + .36731X2 + .4687X2 + .0053X^ 
(-.359) (3.875) (10.599) (5.149) (.892) 
= .7059 (4.5) 
Adding here refers to the inclusion of another term. The 
reader will note that in order to estimate this model by 
ordinary least squares, we must assume a multiplicative error 
term. 
2 The figures in parentheses are the simple one-sided t-
tests where HQ : B = 0. 
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inr = -.28389 + .30264X^ - .63269X2 + .46850X2 + .00532X. 
(-.358) (3.970) (-17.719) (5.207) (.893) 
= .7861 (4.6) 
In both equations the coefficients on , X^, and X^ are 
correct in sign and significant at the one percent level. The 
intercept term and the coefficient on X^ are insignificant in 
both equations. The interpretation of this insignificance for 
X^ is straightforward. The percent of students attending 
private schools does not vary enough from county to county to 
be of statistical importance in Iowa. This does not mean that 
X^, in general, is not an important variable theoretically or 
empirically- It simply means that in this specific case it is 
not a significant cause of the variation in either r or W. In 
addition, because the coefficient is insignificant and its 
-2 deletion does not affect the other coefficients or decrease R 
appreciably, we can assume that the wrong sign is due to the 
sampling distribution of the estimates^. 
The interpretation of the intercept is a bit more subtle. 
Remember that the equation is in logarithmic form. The 
estimated value for In A is insignificantly different from 
zero. Therefore, when anti-logs are taken to get back to the 
^In the equation for r, the deletion of X^ lowers R^ from 
.7770 to .7765; however, in the equation for W, its deletion 
raises R^ from .6934 to .6942. 
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original functional form, we have for the constant term: 
In A = 0 
A = e° 
A = 1 
This not only satisfies the a priori hypothesis that A be 
positive, but also seems to be a reasonable or logical value 
for A to have. 
Eliminating the insignificant variable, and taking the 
anti-logs of Equations 4.5 and 4.6, we arrive back at our 
original functional forms. 
W =  ^^.36731 ^^.46847 M.7) 
r = X^-30264 ^.8, 
Up until now, simple observation of the B's, Z's and their 
respective t-values has been enough to accept Hypotheses l-H-2 
through l-H-5 and 2-H-2 through 2-H-6. This applies as well to 
3-H-l, the elasticity hypothesis. The homogeneity hypotheses, 
1-H-l and 2-H-l, however, involve a somewhat more complex test. 
For a discussion of this d-statistic and its concomitant t-
test, see Rao and Miller (3). 
For Equation 4.7 let: 
di = $1 + 02 + ^3 = 1.13846 
46 
Hn : = 1 
H : H is false 
a n 
The estimate of the variance of is: 
VN /N /S /N /s y\ /\ 
V(d^) = V(B^) + V(B^) + Vfgj) + 2Cov(^j_,$^) + 2Cov(6^,S3) 
+ ZCOVfgg'B]) 
V(d^) = .87614 + .17247 + .11885 + 2(.02417) + 2(-.10354) 
+ 2(-.18981) 
V(d^) = .62910 
/V(d^) = .76596 
The t-statistic computed from d is: 
t = d, - 1 
• with T-K-1 degrees of freedom 
/V(d^) 
t = 4##= -"07 
This is obviously insignificant; therefore, we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis^. 
For this and the following 2-sided t-test, the one per­
cent level was used so as to conform with the level of 
significance obtained in the parameter estimates. 
47 
For Equation 4.8, let: 
dg = + Zg + Zg = .13845 
Kn = *2 = 0 
H : H is false 
a n 
Here the estimate of the variance of d^ is : 
V(d^) = .00610 + .00120 + .00827 + 2(.0016) + 2(-.0072) 
+ 2(-.00132) 
Vtdg) = .01181 
/V(d_) = .06387 
dp—0 
t = ———— with T-K-1 degrees of freedom 
/V^dg) 
This calculated t with 94 degrees of freedom is also in­
significant at the one percent level. Here too we must accept 
the null hypothesis and conclude that the function for r is 
homogeneous of degree zero. 
Empirical Solution 
Now that we have an empirical estimate of the model, the 
next step is to solve for the equilibrium tax rates. This 
will be somewhat easier than the theoretical solution of 
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Chapter III indicated, since the variable has been statis­
tically deleted, leaving us with a three variable model. Now 
when Xg is made a parameter set equal to the state-wide 
average, the model is reduced to two independent variables— 
property and income. Thus, the empirical version of Equation 
3.7 is: 
.36731 
(4.9) 
Y .30268 y 
w %i *2 
.2288 [.2288] ^.2288 J 
and, consequently, the empirical version of Equation 3.9 is: 
A. 36731 
(.30268 + .36731) 
Y -.69732 
[ ^ 2 1 W 
.30268 ^1 2288 ^ . 2 2 8 8 )  [.2288J 
„  ,  2 2 8 8  
.36731 
.30268 
[ ^ 2 ' 
-.63269 Y 
^2 
.2288J [,2288j .2288 
The terms in brackets are the first order partials of 
W ^1 ^2 
223§ with respect to 2288 respectively. These 
terms can be rewritten in the following fashion: 
30268 
y -.69732 y 
^1 ^2 
[.2288 J [. 2288J 
,36731 
= .30268 
W 
2288 
"1 
2288 
(4.11) 
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36731 
>^11 .30268 
' ^2 1 
-.63269 W 
= .36731 .2288 
[.2288J ,.2288j 
2 2 8 8  
(4.12) 
Setting all variables equal to their respective state­
wide averages 
$53,653 
W 
2288 *704; _2288 $12,648; and ^2288 
, we can evaluate Equations 4.11 and 4.12 to obtain 
the "fair share" (value of the marginal demand) tax rates. 
These are: 
P = value of the marginal demand tax rate on income = .01685 
(4.13) 
* 
r = value of the marginal demand tax rate on property = .00482 
(4.14) 
* * 
Now, if our technique is reasonable, dividing and r 
by + B2 (which is equal to .66999) should "scale up" the 
income and property tax rates so that they jointly share the 
burden belonging to and yield a consistent solution. 
y p = 
y .6699 
= 0.2515 (4.15) 
r = 
. 6699 
= .00719 (4.16) 
It is easily verified that these rates are indeed con­
sistent. That is to say, if they are interpreted and applied 
as proportional tax rates on their respective bases, they will 
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together yield the requisite $7 04 per public school student. 
In addition, as previously mentioned, proportional rates, if 
evenly applied, will distribute the burden on each base in 
accordance with the horizontal and vertical equity criteria 
of Chapter I. 
Table 3 contains the inter-county impact and redistribu­
tion effects of the new tax package. The columns are as 
follows : 
Y . 
Column 1: —— = per capita income tax burden in county i 
i 
with the calculated income tax rate of .02515. 
Pt. 
Column 2: —— = the property tax burden in county i with 
i 
the new state-wide millage rate of .00712 levied on market 
value. 
T. 
Column 3: — = the total per capita tax burden in county 
i 
i under the new tax scheme. This is simply the sum of Columns 
1 and 2. 
T. 
Column 4: — = the total dollars raised per public school 
i 
student in county i under the new tax scheme. 
AT. 
Column 5: —— = the change in the per capita educational 
^i 
tax burden in county i resulting from the new tax 
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Table 3. The impact and redistribution effects of the new tax 
package 
County \i 
Pt. 1 T. 1 T. 1 AT^ R. 1 
n. 1 n. 1 ^i S  .  1 ^i ^i 
Adair 73 127 200 773 - 5 -18 
Adams 61 123 183 710 -23 - 2 
Allamakee 58 91 149 589 5 29 
Appanoose 61 65 126 616 4 18 
Audubon 60 135 195 725 -10 - 6 
Benton 72 123 195 747 2 -11 
Black Hawk 76 56 132 578 - 3 29 
Boone 71 103 174 834 7 -27 
Bremer 74 83 157 674 11 7 
Buchanan 63 85 148 601 -13 25 
Buena Vista 76 115 191 833 37 -30 
Butler 64 114 178 678 1 7 
Calhoun 68 151 219 919 15 -51 
Carroll 60 101 161 1,013 46 -49 
Cass 69 106 175 723 34 - 5 
Cedar 74 115 189 731 -12 - 7 
Cerro Gordo 75 88 163 700 - 5 1 
Cherokee 70 121 191 750 28 -12 
Chickasaw 57 95 152 553 - 3 42 
Clarke 68 104 172 835 19 -27 
Clay 77 121 198 779 20 -19 
Clayton 57 81 138 545 -27 40 
CIinton 74 95 169 717 4 - 3 
Crawford 62 110 172 717 - 7 - 3 
Dallas 74 107 181 719 11 - 4 
Davis 63 100 163 660 0 11 
Decatur 50 83 133 665 15 8 
Delaware 59 94 153 608 -19 24 
Des Moines 78 69 147 657 - 6 11 
Dickinson 70 140 210 867 44 -40 
Dubuque 68 62 130 889 6 -27 
Emmett 64 99 163 663 3 10 
Fayette 61 88 149 601 -19 26 
Floyd 67 96 163 685 - 8 5 
Franklin 67 179 246 971 45 — 68 
Fremont 67 143 210 886 - 9 -43 
Greene 78 152 230 956 13 -61 
Grundy 75 159 234 946 23 -60 
Guthrie 62 111 173 787 13 -18 
Hamilton 71 140 211 835 - 5 -33 
Hancock 66 162 228 876 22 -45 
Hardin 74 118 192 822 37 -28 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
County 
Yt. 
X  
Pt. 
1  
T. 
X  
T . 
X  
AT. 
X  
R. 
X  
^i ^i s . X  ^i "i 
Harrison 63 106 169 692 — 6 3 
Henry 72 82 154 672 16 7 
Howard 67 95 162 683 — 6 5 
Humboldt 66 152 218 836 - 1 -34 
Ida 83 142 225 878 5 -45 
Iowa 62 116 178 741 - 7 - 9 
Jackson 65 80 145 624 - 3 19 
Jasper 76 93 169 690 0 3 
Jefferson 70 82 152 686 3 4 
Johnson 76 67 143 788 -22 -15 
Jones 63 98 161 702 -12 
Keokuk 62 106 168 728 2 — 6 
Kossuth 62 139 201 936 - 1 -50 
Lee 72 76 148 696 8 2 
Linn 81 69 150 649 -24 13 
Louisa 67 112 179 702 — 8 
Lucas 65 84 149 622 - 1 20 
Lyon 52 130 192 729 24 - 7 
Madison 57 126 193 800 4 -23 
Mahaska 54 81 145 703 -19 0 
Marion 67 77 144 711 21 - 1 
Marshall 78 86 164 735 -17 - 7 
Mills 79 165 244 1,067 51 -83 
Mitchell 62 98 160 649 3 14 
Monona 65 125 19 0 791 5 -21 
Monroe 59 83 142 653 18 11 
Montgomery 75 107 182 810 20 -24 
Muscatine 75 82 157 640 11 16 
0'Brien 62 119 181 775 27 -17 
Osceola 65 144 209 826 - 5 -31 
Page 68 88 156 737 6 - 7 
Palo Alto 66 118 184 721 - 8 - 4 
Plymouth 60 114 174 797 13 -20 
Pocahontas 65 157 223 942 21 -56 
Polk 87 68 155 683 - 4 5 
Pottawattamie 71 63 134 531 - 9 44 
Poweshiek 79 104 183 773 13 -16 
Ringgold 64 116 180 768 -21 -15 
Sac 72 136 208 813 24 -28 
Scott 83 72 155 636 -24 17 
Shelby 62 120 182 753 1 -12 
Sioux 56 110 166 884 17 -34 
Story 77 66 143 755 6 -10 
Tama 65 107 172 684 -12 5 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
AT. R. 
— — — — n. ÏT-
Yt. Pt. T. T. 1 X  1 1 
n .  n .  n .  s .  
1  1  1  1 
Taylor 57 98 155 696 3 2 
Union 61 84 145 627 5 18 
Van Buren 54 85 139 620 1 19 
Wapello 69 48 117 504 -10 47 
Warren 71 75 146 533 -14 47 
Washington 73 111 184 732 - 1 - 7 
Wayne 59 102 161 743 14 - 9 
Webster 72 90 162 721 21 - 4 
Winnebago 71 110 181 798 35 -21 
Winneshiek 64 74 138 676 2 6 
Woodbury 72 67 139 631 7 16 
Worth 73 140 213 918 16 -50 
Wright 92 143 235 972 24 -65 
system.^ This is simply the difference between Column 1, 
Table 2 and Column 3, Table 3. 
R. 
Column 6: — = the per capita income redistribution 
^i 
among counties which results from the new tax package. If 
Column 6 is negative, this means that county i must pay X 
dollars to the state which will then be redistributed to the 
"needy" counties. If, on the other hand. Column 6 is positive, 
then that county is a recipient of revenue from the state. 
1 
This analysis assumes, of course, that the amount of 
revenue presently raised by the state for education remains 
constant. 
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Obviously, the sign of Column 6 is dependent upon the dollar 
amount of Column 4. If the new combined income and property 
tax raises more than $704 per public school student, Column 6 
will be negative. However, if the new combination raises less 
than $704 per student. Column 5 will be positive. 
It may be of interest to compare and contrast the tax 
package developed here with two alternative proposals. These 
schemes are: first, an all income tax system and, second, as 
referred to in Chapter II, the equalized property tax method. 
The impact and differential effects are contained in Table 4^. 
(Yt) * 
Column 1: ; this is the per capita burden that 
i 
would result if the school property tax was eliminated and the 
requisite dollar amount raised solely by a personal income 
tax (i.e., it would take a proportional income tax rate of 
5.56 percent to raise $704 per student). 
(Yt). f(Py,r) 
Column 2: - ; this is the resulting 
i i 
differential between the all-income tax scheme and the 
proposal developed here. 
(Pt) * 
Column 3: ; this is the per capita burden that 
*i 
would result if the school tax levy was standardized at the 
Also of interest is the impact and differential effects 
of these tax schemes with respect to different socio-economic 
areas of the state. This is discussed in the Appendix. 
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Table 4. The impact of alternative programs 
(Yt)* (Yt)* f(Py,r) (Pt)* (Pt) * f(Py,r) 
County 
^ n. n. n. n. n. n. 1 11 11 1 
Adair 162 -38 231 38 
Adams 134 -49 224 46 
Allamakee 129 -20 165 16 
Appanoose 134 69 118 - 7 
Audubon 132 -63 246 51 
Benton 160 -36 225 29 
Black Hawk 168 36 102 -30 
Boone 156 -17 187 14 
Bremer 163 6 151 -56 
Buchanan 138 - 9 155 75 
Buena Vista 167 -23 209 18 
Butler 142 — 36 208 29 
Calhoun 151 —68 274 56 
Carroll 134 -28 184 23 
Cass 152 -23 193 18 
Cedar 163 —26 210 21 
Cerro Gordo 165 3 160 - 3 
Cherokee 154 -37 221 30 
Chickasaw 127 -26 173 21 
Clarke 150 -22 190 18 
Clay 171 -28 220 22 
Clayton 126 -12 147 9 
Clinton 165 - 5 173 35 
Crawford 137 -35 201 29 
Dallas 164 -17 195 14 
Davis 139 -24 182 19 
Decatur 110 -23 151 18 
Delaware 130 -22 170 18 
Des Moines 173 3 126 -21 
Dickinson 155 -55 254 45 
Dubuque 150 21 112 -17 
Emmett 142 -21 181 17 
Fayette 136 -14 160 11 
Floyd 149 -15 176 12 
Franklin 148 -98 326 80 
Fremont 149 -62 261 50 
Greene 172 -58 278 47 
Grundy 166 -68 289 55 
Guthrie 136 -37 203 30 
Hamilton 158 -53 255 43 
Hancock 145 -82 294 67 
Hardin 164 -29 216 23 
Harrison 140 -30 194 24 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
(Yt). (Yt). f(Py,r) (Pt) . (Pt) . f(Py,r) 
County 
^ n. n. n. n. n. n. 1  1  1 1 1  1  
Henry 160 6 149 - 5 
Howard 148 -14 173 11 
Humboldt 146 -72 277 59 
Ida 184 -41 258 33 
lowa 138 -40 211 33 
Jackson 144 - 1 146 1 
Jasper 168 -95 169 0 
Jefferson 155 4 149 - 3 
Johnson 167 25 122 -21 
Jones 138 -12 179 18 
Keokuk 137 -32 194 26 
Kossuth 137 —64 253 52 
Lee 158 10 139 - 9 
Linn 178 29 125 -24 
Louisa 148 -30 203 25 
Lucas 144 - 5 152 3 
Lyon 137 -54 236 44 
Madison 147 -45 230 37 
Mahaska 141 - 4 148 3 
Marion 149 5 140 - 4 
Marshall 172 8 157 - 7 
Mills 174 -70 301 57 
Mitchell 138 -23 179 19 
Monona 145 —46 228 37 
Monroe 130 -12 152 9 
Montgomery 166 -16 195 13 
Muscatine 167 10 149 — 8 
O'Brien 136 -45 217 36 
Osceola 144 -65 263 53 
Page 150 - 6 161 5 
Palo Alto 147 -37 214 30 
Plymouth 133 -41 208 34 
Pocahontas 144 -79 287 65 
Polk 192 36 125 -30 
Pottawattamie 158 24 114 -20 
Poweshiek 176 - 8 189 6 
Ringgold 142 -38 212 31 
Sac 160 -48 248 39 
Scott 183 28 131 -24 
Shelby 138 -44 218 36 
Sioux 124 -42 200 34 
Story 171 28 120 -23 
Tama 144 -28 195 23 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
(Yt) . (Yt). f(Py,r) (Pt) . (Pt) . f(Py,r) 
County 
n. n. n. n. n. n. 1  1 1  1 1 1  
Taylor 127 -28 178 23 
Union 135 -10 153 8 
Van Buren 120 -20 155 16 
Wapello 153 36 88 -30 
Warren 158 11 137 -10 
Washington 161 -23 203 19 
Wayne 131 -30 186 24 
Webster 160 - 2 163 1 
Winnebago 158 -24 201 19 
Winneshiek 141 3 135 - 3 
Woodbury 160 21 122 -18 
Worth 163 -51 255 42 
Wright 204 -32 261 26 
.0131 state-wide average rate. 
(Pt)^ f(Py,r) 
Column 4 : - ; this is the differential 
ni n. 
impact between the uniform imposition of the state-wide average 
millage rate and the proposal developed here. 
The Equity Implications Compared and Contrasted 
It was demonstrated in Chapter II that, with income as 
the base, the equalized property tax version results in a 
"perverse" redistribution of 43 million dollars in tax burden. 
Those results are repeated here for comparisons sake. The 
statistics were: 
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All property tax method with income as the base : 
Recipients Payers 
Number 1,567,607 1,256,769 
Per capita income $3,028 $2,725 
Per capita subsidy-tax $27.43 $34.22 
Suhsidy-tax as a percent 
of per capita income .009 .0125 
(Based on 1970 data) 
The next comparison involves the all income tax method, 
evaluated with property as the base. In toto, this amounts to 
approximately 31 million dollars in tax burden being redistri­
buted. Again, the switching of bases results in a perceived 
inequitable transfer. 
All income tax method with property as the base : 
Recipients Payers 
Number 1,199,406 1,624,970 
Per capita property $15,974 $9,547 
Per capita subsidy-tax $25.92 $19.13 
Subsidy-tax as a percent of 
per capita property .0 016 .0 02 
(Based on 1970 data) 
Finally, the same test can be applied to the tax package 
developed in this study. With this method, a total redistribu­
tion of approximately 17.3 million dollars in burden takes 
place. Since this is a two dimensional tax scheme, the total 
transfer of burden must be examined with respect to both bases. 
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Two-tax system with property as the base: 
Recipients 
Number 1,511,192 
Per capita property $11,733 
Per capita subsidy-tax $11.43 
Subsidy-tax as a percent of 
per capita property . 0010 
Payers 
1,313,184 
$14,052 
$13.16 
.0009 
(Based on 19 70 data) 
Here, with property as the base, it appears that the 
transfer of burden is in the right direction. Indeed, the 
17.3 million dollars is flowing from the "wealthy" to the 
"poor" 
Two-tcix system with income as the base: 
Recipients 
Number 1,511,192 
Per capita income $2,999 
Per capita subsidy-tax $11.43 
Subsidy-tax as a percent of 
per capita income .0038 
Payers 
1,313,184 
$2,772 
$13.16 
.0047 
(Based on 1970 data) 
Disconcerting as it may seem, the two-tax system evaluated 
with income as the base results in a "wrong-way" transfer of 
burden. On second thought, however, this should be expected. 
Given that property is still taxed and still carries the 
lion's share (55%) of the total levy, one would expect that 
the two-tax system evaluated with income as the base would 
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have the same qualitative equity consequences as the all 
property tax method. 
In Chapter II it was asserted that no unidimensional tax 
evaluated with respect to several different bases will have 
the same perceived equity results unless the several bases are 
highly correlated. We can now add to this statement. No 
multi-tax system will have the same perceived equity conse­
quences when the total resulting burden is evaluated with 
respect to each specific base, unless the bases are highly 
correlated. 
Thus, absolute equity, that is equity invariant with 
respect to base, is in general not possible. But this should 
not be surprising. What is equitable, after all, is a value 
judgment. Does this imply that the analytical efforts con­
tained here have been futile? It does not, if the fundamental 
assumption of Chapter II is accepted. 
The purpose of this paper has been to supply an alterna­
tive method for determining what is equitable. The method 
developed here does not assume that this or that base is the 
correct one for taxation. Nor does it assume that this or that 
base is the correct one for measuring equity. Rather, we 
started with a more fundamental value judgment that escapes 
the base-switching equity dilemma. This premise was: "Leaving 
welfare considerations aside, it seems a reasonable assumption, 
even in the domain of public or quasi-public goods, that the 
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individuals who demand a good should in the main pay for it." 
Given this statement, the problem was to isolate the variables 
giving rise to the demand for education. Once these variables 
were isolated, each could be allocated its "fair or equitable 
share" of the total burden. The imposition of consistently 
applied tax rates on each base will then equitably distribute 
the burden allotted to each base. With this system, base-
switching, with respect to the total burden, becomes a non-
sequiter. 
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CHAPTER V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This study has developed a method for determining how to 
distribute equitably the tax burden resulting from expenditures 
for public elementary and secondary education. At this time 
one observation concerning the theoretical model comes to mind. 
With respect to the empirical results, however, several 
comments should be made. 
The observation with respect to the theoretical model is 
one of interpretation. The B's and Z's were interpreted as 
elasticities throughc ^ t the paper. Strictly speaking these are 
not elasticities in the true sense of the term. The model was 
developed and tested with respect to cross-sectional data. The 
true concept of elasticity, however, is best tested by a time-
series study on a homogeneous group of people. 
The following reflections on the empirical results are in 
order: 
First, because of data restrictions, the model was tested 
with county-wide data. Since the problem involved public 
education, data on the local school districts themselves would 
have been more satisfactory. If this data should become 
available and the model rerun, different and more precise 
estimates for the parameters will almost certainly be the 
result. 
Second, the income tax rates used in the calculations 
contained here exclude corporate income from the tax base. 
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This was done because, on theoretical grounds, corporate 
income does not belong in the demand equation for education. 
Politically, however, it may be impossible to make such an 
exclusion. Consequently, the income tax rate of .02515 solved 
for in this study may be higher than actually needed if this 
system was to be adopted. 
Third, the proportional income tax rate advanced in this 
study may need some defense. It may seem unfair to impose a 
flat rate income tax with no exemptions. However, one must 
keep in mind that the present alternative is the property tax. 
Foeller showed in 1972 (1) that the incidence of the property 
tax in Iowa is highly regressive. In fact, then, the substitu­
tion of a flat rate income tax would be a move away from 
regressivity. 
Fourth, the results obtained here indicate that the number 
of students attending nonpublic schools was statistically 
insignificant. Therefore, this variable was deleted before 
the model was empirically solved. This is fine for abstract 
analysis. When it comes to real world decisions, however, it 
may be hard to justify the increase in levies in some counties 
(e.g., Carroll and Plymouth) that have a relatively high 
percentage of their students enrolled in private schools. In 
fact, it could be argued that all education at the elementary 
and secondary level (including students enrolled in private 
schools) is a public good. Such an assumption would lead to 
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significant changes with respect to the transfer of burden 
among counties. 
In summary, the revenue and equity problems involved in 
financing public education are pervasive. Furthermore, they 
are not going to disappear if we simply ignore them. Rather, 
if the demand for quality education continues to increase as 
it has in the last twenty years and nothing is done, these 
problems are likely to become more pestiferous. 
This study has centered on the specific problem of tax­
payer equity, given that each public school student is entitled 
to an equal dollar amount of education. The major result was 
the finding that income has such an important influence on the 
demand for education. This result, coupled with the almost 
nonexistent correlation between income and the property tax 
base used to finance the major share of public education in 
Iowa, takes us a long way toward understanding this taxpayer 
equity problem. If a conclusion is to be drawn, it is that a 
"higher correlation" between the individuals demanding and the 
individuals financing education is needed. 
Simple solutions, such as an equalized property tax rate 
across the state, may appear to be equitable. But if, as this 
study shows, a major reason for high millage rates in some 
areas is high income and not just low per capita property 
values, this simple solution may not be as equitable as it 
appears. In fact, it would probably be the type of tax, if 
measured with income as the base, that the proponents of this 
system would be the first to deplore. 
In conclusion, it is hoped that this paper has provided 
some new insights into the problems involved in financing 
public education. Needless to say, further research is needed. 
The methodology developed in this study could be a fruitful 
approach for this research to take. 
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APPENDIX. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DIFFERENT TAX SCHEMES 
WITH RESPECT TO SOCIO-ECONOMIC REGIONS IN IOWA 
For the purpose of this analysis, Iowa counties were 
divided into three regions on the basis of urbanization: 
1. Metropolitan - These are the seven counties classified 
as Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas in the 1970 Census 
(7). These seven counties are Black Hawk, Dubuque, Linn, Polk, 
Pottawattamie, Scott and Woodbury. 
2. Urban - All counties with a city of 10,000 or more 
(excluding the seven Metropolitan Counties) were classified as 
urban. The fourteen counties falling into this classification 
are: Boone, Cerro Gordo, Clay, Clinton, Des Moines, Jasper, 
Johnson, Lee, mahaska, Marshall, Muscatine, Story, Wapello and 
Webster. 
3. Rural - The remaining seventy-eight counties, all 
containing cities with a maximum population of less than 10,000, 
are classified as rural. 
The results are: 
Metropolitan 
All All 
Tax scheme Existing Income Property Two-Tax 
Tax Tax 
Dollar burden per capita $138 $158 $108 $131 
% change from existing 
burden per capita +13.66% -22.3% -5.07% 
70 
Urban 
All All 
Tax scheme Existing Income Property Two-Tax 
Tax Tax 
Dollar burden per capita $156 $164 $146 $154 
% change from existing 
burden per capita +5.12% -6.4% -1.28% 
Tax scheme 
Rural 
All All 
Existing Income Property Two-Tax 
Tax Tax 
Dollar burden per capita $185 $160 $220 $193 
% change from existing 
burden per capita -13.51% +18.91% +4.32% 
(Based on 1970 data) 
As is easily seen, the differences are clear cut. The 
all income tax method with a proportional rate of .0556 shifts 
the burden away from the rural taxpayer onto the urban and 
metropolitan populace. The equalized property tax method, on 
the other hand, leads to a dramatic shift in the opposite 
direction. In the middle lies the two-tax system developed in 
the body of this text. This system leads to a moderate 
transfer of burden away from the metropolitan and urban tax­
payer onto the rural counties. 
